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Introduction
If we would like to identify the ultimate challenge of the 21st century we 
will be not able to name a single phenomenon, actor or threat. The media covers 
only the spectacular events from the international politics, thus we can easily 
think  that  terrorism,  the  proliferation  of  weapons  of  mass  destruction,  or 
international criminal activities are isolated events or phenomena. However, we 
have to admit that the root of all challenges lies in the changed conditions for 
development. The states are prone to fail and state failure is a development trap 
from which the country cannot escape from itself. Consequently, the ultimate 
challenge of the 21st century is the complex constellation of state failure which 
gives floor to negative spillover of new threats.
At  the  same  time,  we  also  have  to  admit  that  any  reaction  of  the 
international community presupposes a political decision. The decision makers, 
however, need clear advice. For instance, today, after nine years in Afghanistan 
or seven years in Iraq we can feel some apathy on the level of decision makers, 
especially  in  Europe.  It  is  reasonable  but  definitely  wrong  attitude.  It  is 
understandable  that  a  politician  sees  the  problem  of  state  failure  and 
statebuilding as a too complex puzzle which cannot be solved. Id est, it makes 
no sense to sacrifice  time,  money or  the lives of  the people involved in the 
reconstruction process. On the other hand, a politician may feel a moral duty to 
help people living under inhuman conditions, or may understand the security 
threat  of  untreated state  failure.  In  conclusion,  we need a  new model  which 
defines the problem clearly, which answers the question why we have to deal 
with failed states. We need a model which collects the experiences of former 
historic and normative statebuilding models,  which can respond the query of 
what to do. And finally, we need a model  which can show how we have to 
manage  the  complex  interdependencies  of  the  different  dimensions  of 
development. This is the model which is introduced by this article. The starting 
point is the belief that democracy, or a functioning state is too difficult, if not 
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impossible,  to  achieve  in  a  failed  state.  But  when  Ernő  Rubik  invented  his 
famous cube in the 1970s it was also held impossible to solve. The cube is a 
perfect  analogy  that  six  different  dimensions  can  develop  interdependently 
through different stages of development.
The Rubik’s cube model is not a masterplan for statebuilding but it proves 
that we can follow and repeat certain scheme during the process. Furthermore, 
the model is an exact summary of the existing statebuilding models and it aims 
at simplifying the thinking about state failure and the solutions
The changes in the international system and new definitions
The increasing number of both democratizing countries and failing states 
drew attention to the necessity of rebuilding the security architecture that was 
designed according to the realities of the Cold War. Although, there are several 
ways to address state failure, most of them are ineffective. Even if the problem 
of state failure is not a new phenomenon, there are no clear and comprehensive 
frameworks  which  could  help  analyze,  explain  and  forecast  the  events  and 
phenomena associated with it.  After the end of the Cold War, the term state 
failure appeared in the political lexicons. Humanitarian claims for intervention 
in states which fail to perform the necessary functions became stronger after the 
pictures  of  depressing  events  from  Somalia  to  Cambodia  perambulated  the 
Western media at the beginning of the 1990s. 
The shift towards a more (national) security oriented approach was forced 
by the regrettable events of the simultaneous terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001. The attacks shocked the world, but more importantly woke up the world’s 
alone  superpower  from  its  strategic  slumber.  The  events  finally  raised  the 
attention  of  foreign  policy  scientists  and  researchers  on  the  external 
consequences  of  state  failure.  After  2001,  several  studies  addressed  the 
relationship between the accumulated knowledge on failed states and the policy 
decisions. (see eg. Dorff 2005) Many theorists and policy advisors believed that 
statebuilding is the general cure. (see eg. Dobbins 2007; Fukuyama 2004)
After the end of the bipolar world system, anarchy, which was envisaged 
by Thomas Hobbes,  became the rule in the weak states.  Simultaneously,  the 
scholars (Cooper 2003; Fukuyama 1993; Sorensen 2001) celebrated the victory 
of  democracy  in  the  post-modern  world.  It  is  true  that  on  systemic  level 
democracy became “the only game in town” defeating, or losing its counter-
alternative  organizing principle.  But  the  anarchy  of  the international  system, 
which penetrated in several weak performing states, encumbered the realization 
of the “end of history”. The gap between the pre-modern states and post-modern 
democracies has grown constantly.
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Per definition state failure is an international phenomenon which does not 
know borders and spills over neighboring countries, creating regional and in the 
worst case scenarios international instability. In the world of sovereign states, 
sovereignty  protects  all  states  from  intervention  under  the  aegis  of  the 
international  law,  but  “cooperative  sovereignty”  (Marton  2008)  means  that 
sovereignty is not evidently attached to the state. The territory of the world is the 
common good of the world’s population and the states have the duty to protect 
the population living on the given territory. Territoriality in this sense is not a 
right but a duty to control the sovereign portion of the world’s territory. The 
definition of state failure is the failure of the control of this territory which puts 
the population of the country and the population of other countries in danger. 
The  fact  that  failed  states  are  not  able  to  develop  by  themselves  does  not 
necessarily mean that external actors cannot give useful assistance. In line with 
“cooperative  sovereignty”,  the  external  actors  become  responsible  for  the 
reinstallation and maintenance of  the control  over  the territory.  Statebuilding 
means the rebuilding of the state’s capacity of control the sovereign share. 
Several  studies  were  born  on  the  analogies  between  statebuilding 
experiences in the past and present. The historical examples help understand the 
complexity  of  the  process  but  are  unable  to  provide  clear  and  copyable 
blueprints.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  evident  that  normative  models  (see  eg. 
Dobbins  2007;  Etzioni  2007;  Paris  2004)  and  logical  frameworks  of 
statebuilding  draw  conclusions  from  the  historical  examples.  Thus,  these 
examples are indeed necessary because they lead us to deeper understanding that 
statebuilding is influenced by the complex constellation of different latent and 
manifested factors, dimensions and sequences. 
The Rubik’s cube model
The ultimate challenge in interpreting a complex model is the enormous 
number of variables that influence each other and consequently change the final 
outcome  of  statebuilding.  Contrarily  to  most  of  other  statebuilding  models 
which evaluate specific cases and try to extrapolate the findings to other cases, 
the Rubik’s cube analogy is a schema for thinking about different cases at the 
same time. The number of permutations resonates with the number of different 
options during statebuilding; however, the solution methodology also shows that 
the outcome is always the same despite of the number of different variations. 
With the use of the Rubik’s cube analogy there is a possibility to incorporate the 
high number of variables and different “take off situations”.
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The Beginning and the End Situation of the Solution Process of the Rubik’s Cube. 
Source: Hardwick n.d.
The general  rule  is  that  there  is  a  list  of  well  defined instructions for 
implementing  the  process  from  a  given  initial  state,  through  well  defined 
successive states to a desired outcome. The originality of the algorithms is the 
fact that they are strategies for transforming only the necessary parts without 
scrambling the already solved problems. These strategies can be applied several 
times even in case of different parts during a sequence. Similarly, statebuilding 
is sequenced process but the gradual development of the different dimensions at 
the same time. Thus, the possible interim setbacks cannot indicate the failure of 
the dynamic process. The model incorporates the interconnected development of 
the six dimensions, the security, the institutional, the economic, the societal, the 
domestic  and  the  external  dimensions  through  four  steps.  These  steps  are 
satisfying the basic needs, interim authority, emerging local actors and national 
level development.
In the first sequence, there is a need for at least a minimal state that is able 
to maintain the achievements for the next sequence. During the first sequence, 
the real stakeholder is the international community and the external actors that 
are present in the given country. From the point of view of the external actors, 
the goal of this stage is to create an environment in which the exit strategy is a 
viable option in the future.
The Centerpieces of the Rubik’s Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.
The first sequence of statebuilding represents the fundamental basis for 
future  development.  Without  completing  this,  the  other  sequences  cannot  be 
successful. Basic needs are present in all dimensions, however, does not cover 
comprehensive statebuilding stages.  Basic needs can be satisfied if there is a 
minimal state present that can maintain basic security and order in most of the 
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territory of the state. The goal is to find or create hope for further development. 
Assuming, that the state is incapable to maintain security, the foreign military 
intervention is unavoidable to reestablish peace and security. Nevertheless, the 
success of the intervention depends on other external factors,  such as on the 
willingness of the interveners, on the size and scope of the intervention, on the 
role and reaction of the neighbors, and on the domestic capacities that represent 
the  limits  of  foreign  presence.  The  security-military  dimension  shows  the 
general state of peace and security from that the statebuilders can conclude on 
the size and scope of the needed action. The external dimension has to answer 
the questions: who is able to take the role of leading the statebuilding, and what 
are  its  limits?  Whilst  the  domestic  dimension  gives  clear  picture  about  the 
feasibility of any plans. As long as we believe that external-domestic balance is 
important, we can understand why more external effort is needed in situations, 
where domestic limits are high, that is the capacity of local actors is low. This 
argument  resembles  to  Michael  Doyle  and  Nicholas  Sambanis’  triangle  of 
peacebuilding. Where the hostility is higher, the destruction will be more severe 
and the necessity of heavier international assistance is bigger. The efforts and 
success to resolve civil wars depend on three factors: the degree of hostility; the 
extent  of  local  capacities  remained  after  the  war,  and  the  scope  of  the 
international assistance. (Doyle et al 2006: 4) The lower is the local capacity and 
the bigger is the hostility in the given country, the bigger effort has to be made 
by  the  international  community.  The  triangle’s  territory  represents  the 
opportunity for solution, and the bigger is this territory, the bigger is the hope 
for solution.
The Nexus between the Level of Hostility and the Local Capacities for 
Solutions and the Scope of Necessary International Involvement. Source: Doyle 
et al 2006: 68
Nevertheless, it seems that the three important dimensions in this stage 
are the ones on the vertices of the triangle introduced by Nicolas Sambanis and 
Michael  Doyle.  However,  the  importance  of  the  economic,  societal  and  the 
institutional dimensions are latent, because the real effect of failure in these will 
be revealed only later. For instance, prior democratic experience, the level of 
economic development, or the homogeneity of the society all are factors which 
made former complex interventions easier to succeed. In case of Germany after 
the Second World War, the high level of education and industrial know-how, the 
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strong traditions of rule of law, existing culture of protected property rights, and 
belief in free trade made the job of the occupying powers easier. Similarly, in 
Japan the honorific culture that respects the victor and the discredited former 
ideology, and in addition, such as in Germany, the highly developed economy 
and society made Japan a ready market  for the American statebuilders.  (Bali 
2005; Dempsey 2001; Dobbins et al 2004; Jennings 2003) Similarly, the same 
complexity  of  interdependent  development  of  dimensions  explains  the 
unprecedented and unanticipated success of democracy in India. In India, the 
domestic vertex of Sambani and Doyle’s triangle would have given little hope. 
India  was  not  an  industrialized  country  and  the  middle  class  was 
underdeveloped,  moreover,  the  society  was  deeply  divided  along  ethnic, 
religious and cultural lines. But the legacy of the British colonialism, such as the 
strong centralized state with capable civil service and the democratic elite, made 
India able not to fail like Pakistan. (Shakar 2001)
According to the logic of the sequences, the second stage of statebuilding 
has to contribute to the achievements of the first step. After securing the basis of 
development in all dimensions, the statebuilders have to prepare the local actors 
for  the  transition.  As  it  can  be  seen,  the  external  actors  still  have  the  final 
authority, however, this power should not be permanent,  and the local actors 
should  not  be socialized  for  the trusteeship.  The goal  of  this  sequence  is  to 
identify  the  right  directions  of  future  development.  Using  the  Rubik’s  cube 
analogy, it means that the statebuilders have to identify the right “edge groups”, 
i.e. the nexus among the dimensions.
The Composition of the Edge pieces of the Rubik’s Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.
It  is  still  less  important  to  force  the  local  actors  to  have  a  perfect 
performance,  but it  is crucial that they become slowly part of the process. It 
means  that  the  external  actors  have  to  find  the  appropriate  stakeholders  of 
development, who will be the basis of power transition. During this process, the 
most important goals are avoiding renewed fighting, strengthening the rule of 
law through a strong transitional authority, providing the key public goods and 
services,  and  beginning  reconciliation.  Winning  the  war  does  not  lead 
automatically to sustainable peace. The appropriate interim solutions need the 
joint effort of the external and the local actors even if it slows down the process 
for a while. This stage can be only successful if the root causes of the former 
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conflict  are  not  present  or  they  are  weaker  than  the  attractiveness  of 
development.  This is the key of the future because external actors cannot be 
present indefinitely. Consequently, the final indicator of success of this stage is 
the increased ability of the local actors to bear the responsibility of development 
in the future.
In the interim stage, the significance of the security-military, the external 
and the institutional dimensions seem to be stronger. However, the economic 
dimension is also extremely important, but it is closer relation with the societal 
and the domestic dimensions. It is clear that the presence of foreign actors is the 
key, the development of security situation depends on them, and also they will 
shape the frame of the institutions. On the other hand, the locals can only have 
an  organic  role  in  the  statebuilding  process  if  the  economy  develops. 
Furthermore,  the  societal  conflicts  can  be  mediated  easier  if  the  locals  are 
willing  to  change  the  situation  and  the  opportunity  costs  of  new  economic 
development are higher than the motivation for renewed fighting.
The third sequence of the statebuilding process began in a situation where the external 
actors prepared the environment for power transition and the local stakeholders are identified. 
This  stage  is  for  making  these  stakeholders  feel  the  responsibility  for  the  statebuilding 
process. 
The Sound Composition of the Rubik’s Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.
In all dimensions, the most important goal is to increase the ownership of 
the local actors. Ownership can range from loose attachment to a program, to 
actual controlling authority. In case of complex statebuilding, there is a need of 
excessive external involvement and responsibility in the first two stages due to 
the fact that the cause of conflict was the inability or unwillingness of the state 
to develop the country and provide better life for the people. Emerging local 
ownership indicates that the statebuilding process, and the external assistance 
are responsive to the local needs and consistent with the local capacities and 
priorities. The statebuilding exercise will only be perceived as legitimate in the 
eyes of the people when the local factor is significant and sustainable. It does 
not  necessarily  represent  real  self-determination  in  all  dimensions;  it  rather 
implies  steps which are more than vaguely defined external  prescriptions for 
local  authorities  to  participate  in  the development.  However,  giving the  real 
political  ownership to the local  actors  is  only the final  step of statebuilding, 
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managing the expectations of the people and the local stakeholders are the key 
of  this  sequence.  The  most  important  areas  where  the  enhancement  of  local 
ownership  is  necessary  are  the  administration  of  justice  and  the  civil 
administration. Both postulates are only realizable if the security environment 
allows looser control by the international forces, which obviously implies that 
local  ownership  in  the  security  dimension  has  to  increase,  as  well.  Local 
participation and ownership needs broader consent  of  the society.  Therefore, 
there are several technical tools which can help the process. For instance, the 
translation of materials and documents,  which are related to the statebuilding 
process, and the media appearance are crucial. Trainers are important actors of 
this  stage,  who  help  locals  understand  the  sequences  and  the  needed 
participation better through consultations and trainings on political issues such 
as the demobilization and reintegration process, the security sector reform, or 
the recruitment  for  political  offices.  Concluding from personal  experiences132 
with programs in  Kosovo and Afghanistan,  an external  actor  can  only work 
sufficiently where the local counterpart is also able to participate. We have to 
recognize that a talented, open-minded and educated layer of young experts is 
emerging in all countries where the external community is present. The young 
experts had opportunity to adapt certain knowledge from the external actors but 
at the same time these young experts understand the local dynamics better. They 
are  the  bridge  between  “neo-trusteeship”  and  full  local  independence  in  the 
statebuilding process. 
From  the  external  actors’  point  of  view,  local  ownership  means  the 
possibility  to  leave  the  country.  The  problem is  that  in  reality  the  external 
statebuilders sink into the quagmire of mutually reinforcing dilemmas about the 
effectiveness  of  statebuilding  when  the  locals  have  more  space.  The  self 
governing local  structures  are  not  always  effective  and rather  contradict  the 
goals of the statebuilding process; the short term operational requirements and 
the  long  term  needs  are  usually  conflicting;  and  the  identification  of  local 
partners is not always easy as the external actors do not want to empower the 
potential spoilers of the statebuilding process. Gradual ownership transfer is the 
way  forward,  when  the  short  term  requirements  are  reduced  and  the 
statebuilding means more investment in educational projects. (Narten 2009) 
During  the  last  stage  of  statebuilding,  democratic  structures  have  to 
become dominant in all dimensions. We would easily think that the institutional 
dimension is more important because of the institutional nature of the last stage 
but  it  would  lead  to  false  conclusions.  The  main  problem with  most  of  the 
international mechanisms is the simplistic conditional nature of such programs. 
One good example is the logic of the World Bank or the International Monetary 
Fund, which presumes that institutional change can reform the whole state.
132The author worked for the International Centre for Democratic Transition since 2007. The ICDT has 
programs related to Afghanistan and the Western-Balkans.
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The Composition of the Rubik’s Cube Before “the Last Move”. Source: Hardwick n.d.
The final goal of the stage of national level development and eventually 
the statebuilding process is to put the country on the path of sustainable national 
development,  where  the  country  becomes  the  member  of  the  coherent  and 
interdependent international networks and where the institutions of the state are 
able  to  exploit  the  domestic  endowments  and  the  security  of  the  state,  the 
economy  and  the  society  are  in  a  sound  harmony.  This  sequence  aims  at 
preparing the country to be integrated in the global economy, which eventually 
serves  the  security  of  the  given  country  and  the  international  community. 
Statebuilding obviously cannot aim at building a developed state from a failed 
state, but we can say that a statebuilding process is successful, when the state is 
able  to  maintain  its  internal  and  external  security,  possesses  functioning 
institutions, it is able to manage its debt, provides economic growth, manages 
the  societal  conflicts  in  a  peaceful  way,  and  balances  the  external 
interdependency and its  domestic  capacities.  To sum up,  the outcome of the 
statebuilding process is in an ideal-typical case a state which is able to develop 
with the help of its own capacities and is not overly dependent on the external 
conditions.  In  the final  sequence,  the main  question is  not  how to create  or 
maintain physical stability, but how to preserve institutional stability of the state 
which is the final guarantee of security, too.
The dilemmas of the last stage follow from the quality of the institutions. 
The  main  question  is  how  much  state  we  need,  and  what  the  role  of  free 
automatisms in the development is.  This is the sequence when questions and 
dilemmas emerge on the extent of liberalization, decentralization, privatization 
or marketization of the economy. The conflict management ability of the state is 
also a crucial characteristic in this sequence. It is generally accepted that states 
with democratic institutions and functioning democratic mechanisms are more 
able  to  handle  societal  and  economic  conflict  peacefully.  Therefore,  the 
participation of the wider public in development is necessary. This sequence is 
the  appropriate  time  to  expand  participation  in  decision-making  processes, 
because the institutions are strong enough, and the societal grievances will not 
hold the same possibility of renewed conflict  than democratization in former 
stages. Democracy is not the only possible outcome, but without the feedback 
from the people  the state is  not  able  to sustain development  in the complex 
85
interdependent world, because it is unable to collect all the information needed 
without the real participation of the people.
Conclusion
State  failure  became  the  single  most  important  threat  in  international 
development, and we have to recognize that development failure is a threat to 
democratization and to international security in the end. It is easy to read from 
the  literature  on  democratization  and  statebuilding  that  the  only  acceptable 
outcome of statebuilding is the functioning state, id est a liberal democracy. The 
complexity of statebuilding is reflected in the big number of different models on 
statebuilding. The reality eventually shows that statebuilders have to face the 
Rubik’s  cube  of  development,  because  the  number  of  variables  is  high  and 
different in each individual situation whilst the goal is the same in each case: a 
liberal and functioning democracy. 
In  the  world  of  sovereign  states,  sovereignty  protects  all  states  from 
intervention  under  the  aegis  of  the  international  law,  but  “cooperative 
sovereignty” means that sovereignty is not evidently attached to a state.  The 
territory of the world is the common good of the world’s population and the 
states  have  the  duty  to  protect  the  population  living  on  a  given  territory. 
Territoriality  in  this  sense  is  not  a  right  but  a  duty  to  control  the sovereign 
portion of the world’s territory. 
The large number of different solution models called the attention to the 
necessity of a comprehensive, complex but new schema which incorporates in a 
single framework all the dimensions and steps which are present in the different 
models. Statebuilding necessarily means more than the simple reconstruction of 
narrow state functions. It is important to build a state which is legitimate and 
effective,  id  est  a  democratic  and functioning structure.  Statebuilding in  this 
sense  rather  means  shaping  the  environment  which  allows  and  strengthens 
“good state functions” by maintaining a healthy balance between legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the institutions. Furthermore, the state has to become able to 
influence not only these institutions but the environment, as well. 
When  Ernő  Rubik  invented  his  cube  it  was  held  impossible  to  solve. 
Today, only a few months ago, there was published an algorithm which solves 
the cube in 20 moves from every possible beginning situation. It is strikingly 
similar  to  the  general  thinking  about  statebuilding  and  democratization, 
according to which it is impossible to describe statebuilding exercises in a single 
model which handles all the dimensions and steps together. It is beyond doubt 
that the Rubik’s cube analogy can be used as schema for thinking. The model 
pays attention to the interaction and development of the different dimensions in 
each sequence. Differently from other normative models which overemphasize 
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the  role  of  a  single  dimension,  such  as  security,  the  Rubik’s  cube  analogy 
introduces  the  dynamic  and  simultaneous  development  of  six  dimensions: 
security-military; institutional; economic; societal; external and domestic.  The 
connection  among  the  dimensions  is  different  in  each  sequence  and  the 
beginning situation is also not the same in case of different countries.
Bibliography
1. Besenyő,  János,  2008.  Az  Afrikai  konfliktusok  és  kezelésük  sajátosságai,  a 
békefenntartó  műveletek  során  szerzett  tapasztalatok.  [African  conflicts  and  the 
specifics of managing them, the experiences from peacekeeping missions] Felderítő 
Szemle, 7(3), pp 5-15
2. Call,  Charles  T.,  2008.  Building  States  to  Build  Peace?  In:  Call,  Charles  T.  and 
Vanessa Wyeth  (eds.),  2008. Building States  to  Build  Peace.  Boulder,  CO: Lynne 
Rienner, pp 365-388
3. Chesterman,  Simon,  2004.  You,  the  People.  The  United  Nations,  Transitional 
Administration and State-Building. New York: Oxford University Press
4. Collier, Paul, 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and 
What Can Be Done About It. New York: Oxford University Press
5. Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Bethcole Degrasse, 2007. The Beginners’ 
Guide to Nation-Building. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation
6. Dorff,  Robert H., 2005. Failed States after  9/11. International Studies Perspectives, 
6(1), pp 20-34.
7. Etzioni, Amitai, 2007. Security First. New Haven: Yale University Press
8. Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin, 2004. Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak 
States. International Security, 28(4), pp 5-43
9. Fukuyama, Francis, 2004. State-Building. Governance and World Order in the 21st 
Century. New York: Cornell University Press.
 10. Ghani,  Ashraf  and  Claire  Lockhart,  2008.  Fixing  Failed  States.  A Framework  for 
Rebuilding a Fractured World. New York: Oxford University Press
 11. Hardwick, Chris, n.d., Solving the Rubik's Revenge. URL: 
http://www.speedcubing.com/chris/4-solution.html (Accessed: January 12, 2010)
 12. Helman, Gerald B. and Steven R. Ratner, 1993. Saving Failed States. Foreign Policy, 
issue 89, pp 3-18
 13. Krasner, Stephen D., 2004. Sharing Sovereignty. International Security, 29(2), pp 85-
120.
 14. Mansfield,  Edward  D.,  Snyder,  Jack,  2007.  The  “Sequencing”  Fallacy.  Journal  of 
Democracy, 18(3), pp 5-9
 15. Marton, Péter, 2008. Global Governance vs. State Failure. Perspectives, 16(1), pp 85-
108
 16. Paris,  Roland  and  Timothy  D.  Sisk,  2009.  Understanding  the  Contradictions  of 
Postwar  Peacebuilding.  In:  Paris,  Roland  and  Timothy  D.  Sisk  (eds.),  2009.  The 
Dilemmas  of  Statebuilding  Confronting  the  Contradictions  of  Postwar  Peace 
Operations. pp 1-20
 17. Paris, Roland, 2004. At War’s End. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
87
 18. Rotberg, Robert I., 2003. Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and 
Indicators. In: Rotberg, Robert I. (ed.), 2003. State Failure and State Weakness in a 
Time of Terror. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, pp 1-28
 19. Rotberg,  Robert  I.,  2004.  The  Failure  and Collapse  of  Nation-States.  In:  Rotberg, 
Robert  I.  (ed.),  2004.  When  States  Fail:  Causes  and  Consequences.  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, pp 1-49
 20. State Failure Task Force, 2000. Findings III. URL: 
http://www.irisprojects.umd.edu/anticorruption/Files/State_Capacity_Project.pdf 
(Accessed: November 8, 2005)
 21. The Fund for Peace, 2008. The Failed States Index. Foreign Policy, 45, April
 22. Zartman, I. William, 1995. Putting Things Back Together. In: Zartman, I. William, 
ed., Collapsed State. London: Lynne Rienner. pp 267-73
Brigadier-General István Tarján
THE VALIDITY OF SECURITY GEOGRAPHY,
A NEW APPROACH AND OF  DEFINING ITS BASIC 
CATEGORIES
1.The Validity of Security Geography
We may have met the term of security geography several times, but in 
most cases those were limited to one of its segments. Such are the criminal- or 
the  military  geography,  which  are  –  wrongly  –  identified  with  security 
geography.
Does  security  geography  exist  at  all?  Dr.  Mária  Rédei’s  opinion  is 
expressed  in her lecture titled “On the Edge of Geosciences”133 as follows:
“The study of the limits of a science helps in our analysis to mention its 
fields and the continuously appearing new trends. The question of limit can be 
brought up from the side of the new content, with regard to the new indicators, 
which later with more or less regularity get into the study and become a part of 
the science. And there are new topics that may seem far fledged, and attracting a 
lot of attention, but later not followed upon. This is the time when we ask the 
question: is this still geography? A few examples for the new or recurring fields 
of  the  last  decades:  ethnic  and  religion  geography,  criminal  and  security 
geography, regional income differences, information society, e-economy, trade 
133Lecture at Őcsény – Pécs Conference “Our Geography” 17-18 March 2005
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